Who is Responsible for Corruption? Framing strategies of social movements in West Africa mobilizing against presidential term amendments by Prause, Louisa & Wienkoop, Nina-Kathrin



















PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco   
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version) 
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 10(3) 2017: 850-873 
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i3p850 
 
Published in November 15, 2017 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION?  
Framing strategies of social movements in West Africa mobilizing 
against presidential term amendments. 
 
Louisa Prause 
Freie Universität Berlin 
 
Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop 




ABSTRACT: Since 2011 youth movements have staged large protests in African countries for presidential 
term limits. These have been discussed as struggles against de-democratization. Looking at the move-
ments Y’en a marre in Senegal and Balai citoyen in Burkina Faso we argue that these protests were just as 
much triggered by socio-economic grievances linked to a corrupt patronage system. Indeed, corruption 
has been a major issue for both campaigns. We ask how the movement leaders linked the fight against 
corruption with their struggle against third term amendments in a way that sparked mass mobilization. We 
use the framing approach as our theoretical framework and show that a framing based on the concept of 
citizenship enabled both movements to link the issue of corruption to the issue of presidential term 
amendments and at the same time create a sense of agency in the constituency. This explains at least part-
ly why both Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen succeeded in their mobilizing efforts.  
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1. Introduction   
 
Corruption is a major factor negatively influencing the economic and democratic de-
velopment of countries worldwide (Holmes 2006; You and Khagram 2005). Corruption 
also serves as a powerful tool through which politicians gain power and maintain their 
positions in office (Norris 2012; Bueno de Mesquita 2005). This fundamentally under-
mines citizens’ trust in the political system, creating a gap between citizens and their 
elected representatives (Kubbe forthcoming). This is particularly evident in African 
countries, where clientelism and high rates of corruption adversely affect democratic 
governance (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Médard 2002).  
In recent years, mass protests have sprung up in several African countries in order to 
defend democratic institutions. Many of these protests were sparked by attempts of 
presidents and political elites to change presidential term limits or manipulate consti-
tutions (LeBas 2016; Yarwood 2016). Corruption has been a major issue in several of 
these movements. However, the issue of corruption is not widely discussed in the aca-
demic and media debate on these movements. This is surprising as studies on earlier 
pro-democracy movements have shown that mobilization for democracy and corrup-
tion are often linked - not only in Europe but also in Africa (Harsch 1993).  
In this article, we look at two social movements1 in West Africa that successfully mo-
bilized thousands of supporters in their struggle to fight third term amendments: Y’en a 
marre (We are fed up) in Senegal, and Balai Citoyen (Citizens' Broom) in Burkina Faso. 
Y'en a marre was initially aimed at protesting ongoing electricity cuts in Dakar which 
were closely related to bad governance and corruption in the ministry of energy. The 
movement leaders mobilized the masses in 2011 and 2012, when the incumbent presi-
dent Abdoulaye Wade tried to extend his term in office. In neighboring Burkina Faso, 
protest erupted in 2013 when the president Blaise Compaoré tried to change the con-
stitution to his direct benefit and favor. Balai Citoyen emerged with the aim to “clean 
up” the system of corrupt elite behavior; hence they named themselves ‘the citizens’ 
broom’. Both pro-democracy uprisings gained massive support especially from young 
constituencies. They successfully mobilized citizens as watchdogs for corrupt politicians 
and contributed to installing a new president in both countries (in Senegal Wade was 
 
1 Even in a rather narrow understanding of the term, both dominant actors in those popular uprisings qual-
ify as social movements. They consist of (1) a dense network with (2) a shared collective identity beyond 
specific events who try to (3) prevent or promote societal change by (4) non-institutionalized tactics as our 
short description of the protest events demonstrate (della Porta/Diani 1999; Snow et al. 2004: 11).  
 




voted out of office, while Compaoré was ousted through mass resistance by the popu-
lation).  
In this article, we ask how the movements Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen in Senegal 
and Burkina Faso succeeded in linking the fight against corruption to their struggle 
against third term amendments. We aim to identify the discursive strategies that allow 
movements to bridge the topics of third term amendments and corruption as well as 
the conditions that impact such strategies.  
Both movements provide examples of persuasive anti-corruption framing within a 
struggle to defend constitutional democracy. Looking at the way in which pro-
democracy movements pick up the issue of corruption is highly important, since em-
powered citizens are one of the most powerful forces to fight corruption (Welzel, 
Ingelhart, and Deutsch 2005). We argue that the issue of corruption is also highly im-
portant to successful mobilization in pro-democracy struggles, since it underlines the 
injustice of current regimes. Balai Citoyen and Y’en a marre not only denounced cor-
rupt politicians, they framed corruption as part of the political system that can be chal-
lenged and changed by every citizen, thus adding an important mobilizing component 
to their framing. With our analysis, we aim to contribute to the study of pro-democracy 
movements in Africa, as well as the literature on the nexus of political culture and cor-
ruption. The focus on corruption also offers a new reading on third term amendment 
struggles in Africa, stressing the link of political and socio-economic grievances, ex-
pressed through the criticism of corruption.  
The article is structured as follows: first we place our analysis at the interface of po-
litical culture approaches within corruption studies and social movement research. We 
then describe our theoretical framework – the framing approach – and our methodol-
ogy. In the empirical part, we present the main protest events of Y’en a marre and 
Balai Citoyen and identify and compare their framing strategies. We conclude by illus-
trating how both movements succeeded in linking the issues of corruption and third 
term amendments in one congruent frame and identify key factors that explain why 
their framing strategies differ in some respects while showing striking similarities in 
other.   
 
 
2. Anti-corruption mobilizations of social movements in Africa  
 
In the field of corruption research, the focus has been for a long time on the inter-
play between elites’ behavior, institutional settings, and corruption rates (Norris 2012; 
Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Collier 2002). Scholars have only recently turned 




to political culture and the decisive role of empowered citizens to overcome corruption 
(Welzel 2013). However, citizens can only function as watchdogs against corrupt elites 
if certain democratic norms that encompass democratic values, social capital, civil soci-
ety, and civic culture enter the majoritarian public opinion and culture. Thus, to be ef-
fective in fighting corruption empowered citizens have to match the majoritarian public 
opinion and need the support of parts of the political elite (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). This 
is in line with the findings by Kubbe (2017) who underlines that people, who tolerate 
corrupt behavior of elites, are more likely to act corrupt themselves and thus repro-
duce corrupt systems. Nevertheless, even societies in (partly) democratized states face 
tremendous challenges to get people to the street and to proclaim and defend demo-
cratic norms. In particular, former colonized states as well as states marked by particu-
larism have difficulties to mobilize “some sort of critical mass” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, 
109).  
In those debates, two blind spots can be identified that will be addressed partly by 
our research – firstly, those studies mainly focus on examples where collective action 
has impacted democratic freedom positively. Cases where certain democratic rights 
and citizenship culture are reached but still need to be defended are less considered. In 
the cases studied in this article, democracy has been on the rise but became anew un-
der threat - a phenomenon that can currently be observed in many countries. Second-
ly, the ways in which leaders and activists construct and present corruption and link it 
to other prominent issues in order to mobilize people is often overlooked. Where this 
has been studied, the focus has been on the success of civil society actors regarding the 
lowering of corruption, not the mobilization of citizens (Johnston 2005). Success is pre-
dominantly understood as lower corruption rates not in terms of anti-corruption mobi-
lization. Consequently, the question of how social movements make sense of corrup-
tion and link it to citizens’ and elites’ behavior has been understudied. The social 
movement literature on anti-corruption mobilization treats these aspects more explic-
itly. But this academic debate focuses almost exclusively on cases from Europe and 
North America and to a lesser extent on Latin America (Della Porta 2015; Della Porta 
and Mény 1997). Social movements in Africa and their struggle against corruption have 
received very little attention.  
At the interface of social movement studies and studies on democracy several au-
thors have looked at recent uprisings in Africa against presidential term amendments. 
Until now, these struggles have been discussed only as movements against de-
democratization. They have been analyzed with regard to their effects on democratiza-
tion processes, mobilization strategies, and interactions with state actors (Reyntjens 
2016; Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2011). The issue of corruption in those uprisings has 




been widely overlooked. As our analysis will show, movements often bring together di-
verse issues within their framing and the issue of corruption has played a pervasive role 
in these uprisings. 
 
 
3. Researching collective-action frames 
 
The framing-approach can be a helpful theoretical approach to understand how so-
cial movement actors make sense of corruption. Frames are schemata of interpretation 
that social movement actors construct strategically with the aim to mobilize for con-
tentious action (Goffman 1974; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). The 
framing-approach enables us to analyze how social movement actors bring together 
diverse topics and interpret and present them in a way that is salient and resonant to 
its addressees. This allows us to identify how social movements construct corruption in 
a way that appeals to its audience and mobilizes people for collective actions. 
In order to mobilize people for protest, movement leaders need to construct the 
conditions which the movement aims to change in such a way, that people perceive 
them as problematic and changeable. They do so by using collective action frames 
(Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).  
Collective action frames are “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that in-
spire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” 
(Benford and Snow 2000, 614). They enable participants and bystanders to “locate, 
perceive and label occurrences” (Snow et al. 1986, 464) by “selectively punctuating and 
encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within 
one’s present and past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992, 337). To make sense of 
frames Snow and Benford (1988) propose the analytical distinction of three core fram-
ing tasks: diagnostic framing presents an event, a situation or a social condition as 
problematic and in need of change.  It also attributes blame und often presents certain 
circumstances as unjust. Prognostic framing answers the question of ‘What needs to be 
done?’ and offers a solution to the diagnosed problem. It may also include specific 
proposals regarding strategies and targets (Snow and Benford 1992). Motivational 
framing provides a rationale for engaging in collective action (Benford 1993). Collective 
action frames can, but do not have to, entail all three dimensions. This analytical dis-
tinction allows for the identification of the discursive strategies social movements use 
to bring distinct events, conditions and topics together under one congruent frame.   
Frames are constructed to achieve certain goals: mobilize participants for protests, 
recruit new members, find new allies or acquire resources. In order to link their claims 




and interpretative frames with those of potential supporters and constituents, social 
movement leaders engage in frame alignment processes. David Snow and Robert Ben-
ford (1986) identified four key alinment processes: Frame bridging, frame extension, 
frame transformation and frame amplification. The latter “involves the idealization, 
embellishment, clarification or invigoration of existing values and beliefs” (Benford and 
Snow 2000, 624). Social movement leaders link the ideas they propose to widely 
known cultural symbols, meanings or historic events (Snow and Benford 1988). The 
alignment of a frame with the broader cultural context is key for collective action 
frames to become resonant and therefore effective.  
Frame amplification makes clear, that the framing choices of social movement actors 
are not arbitrary. The cultural context in which they operate provides important incen-
tives and constraints for certain frames (Jaspers 1997). Framing choices might also be 
influenced by concrete political opportunities, such as new allies and resulting interac-
tions with other movements or civil society organizations, or important events that 
lead to a shift in the broader political and cultural discourse of a society (Ferree 2003). 
Successful frames are often diffused among different movements and between differ-
ent national contexts (Benford and Snow 2000). In order to be convincing to its con-
stituents and the public, the movement’s frames need to correspond to its own collec-
tive identity, which in turn often relates to popular collective identities in the wider cul-
tural context (Poletta and Jasper 2001).   
The framing approach offers important tools to analyze the way in which social 
movements make sense of corruption. It enables us on the one hand to deceiver the 
meaning constructions and strategies social movement leaders use to integrate differ-
ent topics within one coherent framework; in the cases at hand corruption and third 
term amendments. In combination with other concepts such as identity, diffusion, the 
cultural context, and political opportunities the framing-approach also offers some in-
sights as to why the social movement leaders opt for a certain presentation of corrup-
tion in their struggles against third term amendments.  
In this article we use the framing-approach as our theoretical framework to analyze 
the discursive strategies used by the movements Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen. In or-
der to do so, we use a multiple case study design (Yin 2009). This design is useful since 
our study is exploratory in nature (Yin 2009, 5). We aim to identify how both move-
ments succeeded in linking the issue of corruption to the issue of third term amend-
ments. The analysis of two case studies allows us to deduce dimensions of the cultural 
and political contexts which the respective movements face that might have influenced 
their framing choices. Two case studies offer the advantage of allowing for “a balanced 
combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge” (Tarrow 2010, 246).  




Our interest is both intrinsic with regard to the framing strategies used by both 
movements and instrumental, as we hope to develop a hypothesis on which frames al-
low for the construction of a link between third term amendments and corruption 
more generally. We chose Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen since both can be positioned 
along a line of a broader wave of mobilization against third term amendments that 
took place in Africa from 2001 onwards (Manji and Ekine 2012). Unlike the struggles in 
the beginning of the 2000’s, Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen also addressed broader is-
sues such as bad governance and corruption. In addition, the struggles in Senegal and 
Burkina Faso have also been less dominated by opposition parties which had been at 
the forefront of earlier uprisings against third term amendments. Both are cases of 
specific interest for analyzing framing strategies as both movements have been very 
successful in making their claims heard in national and international media – the latter 
is rarely achieved by social movements taking place on the African continent.  
We selected both cases following the logic of literal replication (Yin 2009, 46). We 
chose two movements with similar characteristics, mobilizing for a similar aim in simi-
lar context conditions, thus assuming that the way in which they frame corruption will 
also be similar. The two movements under study – Y’en a marre and Balai citoyen – are 
regularly compared due to their mobilization and leaders (Niang 2015). Led by musi-
cians and journalists, both movements’ leaders derived (partly) from the middle-class, 
demonstrated high rhetoric skills, and have access to media as well as to other com-
munication channels due to their prior popularity. Since movement leaders are central 
agents strategically constructing frames and developing framing strategies. Within 
those movements, activists predominantly were from the popular class under which 
Seddon and Zeilig (2005) subsume students, workers of formal and informal sectors as 
well as the youth. The members of the movements were mainly male living in the ur-
ban centers. Apart from movement characteristics, both mobilizations happened in a 
comparative institutional setting. Senegal and Burkina Faso share the same presiden-
tial constitutions and electoral systems. Certain democratic rights such as the freedom 
of expression and the right to assembly are formally allowed.  
For both movements we analyze the period from the founding of the respective 
movements until the presidential resignation – in Senegal from January 2011 to March 
2012; in Burkina Faso from July 2013 to October 2014. Social movements most com-
monly express frames through written documents, verbal expressions and visual repre-
sentations (Johnston 2002). Our data therefore consists of movement documents such 
as declarations and press communications, rap songs, and transcribed semi-structured 




interviews with the movements’ leaders and core activists.2 Twelve interviews were 
conducted with Y’en a marre activists from February to March 2012 by Louisa Prause 
and further fourteen interviews with leaders from the movement, more formalized civil 
society, and external experts were conducted by Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop from January 
to February 2017. Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop also carried out fifteen interviews, among 
others with movement leaders of Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso from February to March 
2017.3  
We used qualitative content analysis to identify the diagnostic, prognostic and moti-
vational elements of the collective action frames (Mayring 2014). For each dimension 
we identified the key issues on a content level and the key arguments put forward by 
the movement; looked at central symbols that were used by the movements, such as 
metaphors, historical references, slogans as well as catch phrases, and analyzed refer-
ences and appeals to the broader cultural context (Ryan 1991). In the following empiri-
cal analysis, we first describe each movement’s mobilizations and identify the key 
frames that allowed to link the issues of corruption and third term amendments. We 
then compare the framing of both movements to deduce similarities and differences in 
order to develop explanations regarding these similarities and differences.   
 
 
4. Y’en a marre: Rap, protests, corruption and a ‘citizenship frame’ 
The movement Y’en a marre (We are fed up) was one of the key forces that mobi-
lized for collective protests in the run up to the presidential elections in Senegal in 
2012. Similar to the presidential election in 2000, the youth stood up against the in-
cumbent president. But different to this former struggle, the alliances and claims have 
been broader and not directly linked to the oppositional candidates. In 2000, the youth 
campaigned for Wade to become president in Senegal. However, over the following 
ten years it became clear that Wade would not fulfill his promises but in contrast 
seemed to have forgotten his former supporters. 
In 2011 and 2012 a wide range of actors such as oppositional parties, student associ-
ations, unions, civil society organizations, and media entrepreneurs mobilized against 
 
2 We are particularly grateful to our interview partners in Senegal and Burkina Faso for invaluable input. 
We also highly appreciate the logistical support of our field research from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation 
Senegal, Rosa-Luxembourg Foundation Senegal, and Institut Général Tiémoko Marc Garango pour la Gou-
vernance et le Développement (IGD) in Ouagadougou.   
3 Direct quotations from the interviews, movement documents and rap songs were translated from French 
to English by the authors. 




attempts of the president Wade to secure a third term in office (Hartmann 2012). Y’en 
a marre was a new actor in the lively civil society scene of Senegal (Honwanda 2015). 
The organization was founded on 16 January 2011 by a group of rappers and journalists 
who make up the leadership of the movement until today. Founding members were 
the journalist Fadel Barro as well as the rappers Thiat and Kilifeu of the famous hip-hop 
group Keur Gui. Later they were joined by other popular Senegalese rappers. This 
alignment of hip-hop culture and political engagement is not new for the Senegalese 
political arena. Since the 1990s, groups such as Positive Black Soul whose album Boule 
Fale (drop it) served as name giver for a youth movement that has been articulating 
political criticism against the government especially prior to the elections in 2000 (Har-
vard 2001).  
Initially the idea to form Y’en a marre was sparked by constant electricity cuts 
throughout the country, which lasted up to several days and were especially frequent 
in the poor suburbs of Dakar (Interview, movement leader Y’en a marre, 28 February 
2012, Dakar). The movement staged several important protest events throughout the 
following year. In March, they launched a campaign called “1000 complaints against 
the government of Senegal”. Only two weeks later, on March 19, the public holiday of 
the ‘alternance’, Y’en a marre took to the streets for the first time. In Senegal, this day 
commemorates the peaceful handover of presidency from Abdou Diouf of the socialist 
party to Wade from the liberal party in 2000 (Diop 2010). Since 2001, Wade had put 
himself at the center of these festivities to demonstrate his power. In protest to this 
appropriation of the ‘alternance’, Y’en a marre proposed to commemorate the political 
commitment of the Senegalese citizens in 2000 (Document, Y’en a marre, Declaration, 
19 March 2011).  
In April, Y’en a marre launched their campaign Daas Fanaanal (My voter’s card, my 
weapon) to motivate the youth to register to vote in the upcoming presidential elec-
tions. They articulated their message via rap-concerts, social media channels and the 
media. Those concerts in their own understanding served as pedagogical events to in-
form the people about bad governance practices as well as their rights and duties as 
citizens (Gueye 2013). On 23 June 2011, Senegal saw the largest mass protests since 
the pre-election protests in 2000. Y’en a marre along with other oppositional groups 
blocked the national assembly. On that day, the parliament was about to vote on a law, 
which would have almost certainly guaranteed the reelection of Wade. The protests 
succeeded and Wade took back his proposal.  
On 27 January 2012, however, the Senegalese constitutional council, a legal advisory 
board, decided that the third candidature of Wade was legal. This classification sparked 
several mass protests staged around the Place de l’Obelisque in central Dakar. Y’en a 




marre protested alongside several oppositional parties and human rights organizations 
that had formed the Movement of the 23 June (M23). Nevertheless, Wade ran in the 
elections and made it to the second round, where he ran against the candidate Macky 
Sall. Y’en a marre yet again mobilized voters to participate in the elections, this time 
under the slogan Doggali (finish him off). On 25 March Macky Sall won the presidential 
election and became the fourth president of Senegal.    
Y’en a marre’s framing was a major factor contributing to their successful mobiliza-
tion of the Senegalese youth. In their frame they brought together several issues under 
the concept of ‘citizenship’. This enabled them to link their fight against third term 
amendments to their fight against corruption. In their diagnostic framing, Y’en a marre 
raises several different socio-economic grievances such as electricity cuts, bad health 
care, jobs, and education as central problems in Senegal (Document, Y’en a marre, Dec-
laration, 19 March 2011). They named youth unemployment in particular as a burden 
for future development and hence placed their struggle along a social cleavage that 
had already dominated previous elections and electoral decisions. As a major cause of 
these grievances, they identified a corrupt political system (Document, Y’en a marre, 
Declaration, 19 March 2011). However, Y’en a marre framed corruption not just as a 
characteristic of Senegalese elites, but as a characteristic of the wider political and cul-
tural habits of Senegalese society. As such they state: “We are fed up with taking a car 
rapide4 which is overloaded and then witnessing how the police takes the money of the 
drivers without denouncing this”. In their view, the tolerance of everyday corruption 
turns every citizen into a collaborator with the system. As a reaction to Wade’s at-
tempts to use the constitution to legitimize his running for a third term in office, they 
extended their framing and diagnosed the violation of the constitution and republican 
values as a major problem (Document, Y’en a marre, Declaration 28 June 2011). They 
bring these two issues together by framing them both as an abuse of citizens’ rights: 
their political and their socio-economic rights (Document, Y’en a marre, Declaration 19 
March & 28 June 2011). Responsibility for both is attributed on the one hand to former 
president Wade, who symbolized the political elites in Senegal, but on the other also to 
the Senegalese citizens themselves (Prause 2013).  
In their prognostic framing Y’en a marre proposes to respect the rule of law as the 
key solution of the identified problems. In the song Daas Fanaanal they rap: “Senegal is 
for everyone. It includes everyone. The minister and the porter both have the same 
rights”. Hereby, their proposal goes beyond a pure change of presidency. It is not just 
Wade and other corrupt politicians who have to leave office; the whole political culture 
 
4 Multicolored mini-buses used for public transport are called ‘car rapide’ in Senegal. 




needs to change: “I am also fed up with myself, always resigned without caring about 
the future of my community” (Document, Y’en a marre, Declaration 19 March 2011). 
To integrate their critique on the political elites and their claim for a new political cul-
ture that respects the rule of law and does not tolerate corruption they present their 
concept Nouveau Type de Sénégalais (New Type of Senegalese, NTS). This concept re-
fers to a new Senegalese citizen, that is “responsible, honest, and committed to a social 
transformation in Senegal”, who “holds up the values of the Republic” and as such pro-
tects the democratic institutions (Document, Y’en a marre, Declaration 19 March 
2011). Each citizen is presented as part of the problem and part of the solution simul-
taneously. They thus not only refer to citizens’ rights but also to citizens’ duties.  
In their motivational framing, Y’en a marre takes up the empowerment component 
of citizenship. In their Song “Faux! Pas Forcé” (Fake! Don’t Push) they rap: “We will be 
present wherever you summon us. A revolted nation is no match for an old thug”. The 
‘old thug’ of cause, refers to the president at the time, Abdoulaye Wade. Parallel to 
other movements such as Podemos in Spain, the main message here is that change is 
possible. Y’en a marre thus offers an alternative image of Senegalese citizens who are 
often perceived as passive and resigned to their fate (Interview, Fadel Barro, 28 Febru-
ary 2012, Dakar). Citizenship in Y’en a marre’s interpretation always means citizens 
empowered to achieve political and social change. This explicitly not only entails the 
power to protect the constitution but also to fight corruption on an everyday basis. 
Corruption is presented as a main expression of putting the personal gain over the pub-
lic good and the rule of law. Thus, to protect the rule of law and build a new Senega-
lese republic one has to start by fighting the everyday practices through which the cur-
rent political culture is reproduced.  
Y’en a marre succeeded in linking the fight against corruption with the fight against 
the third term amendment of Abdoulaye Wade through a ‘citizenship frame’. In refer-
ring to a citizen’s rights and duties, they were successful in bridging the so far uncon-
nected topics of corruption and constitutional term amendments. Their reference to 
empowered citizens served as an important motivational component of their framing 
to mobilize the Senegalese youth. Y’en a marre also engaged in frame amplification 
through the repeated reference to the republic and the connected value of the rule of 
law. As such they link their framing to long standing discourses about the value of the 
Republic that have been introduced in Senegal through French colonialism and adopt-








5. Balai Citoyen: Framing corruption as a contradiction to Burkinabe sincerity 
 
In 2013, after 27 years in office, the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, an-
nounced his intention to establish a senate that would expand his already extensive 
presidential powers. As a reaction two popular artists, Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah, ini-
tiated together with journalists the movement Balai Citoyen. To sweep the corrupt clan 
of Compaoré away, they called their movement ‘citizens’ broom’. The ordinary Burk-
inabe broom became the famous protest symbol of their uprising. The movement be-
came rapidly popular among the urban youth. They organized a number of protest 
events in collaboration with other opponents of Compaoré who resigned on 31 Octo-
ber 2014.  
Even before Balai Citoyen emerged as a social movement in Burkina Faso, many hu-
man rights organizations, trade unions, and opposition political parties have been ac-
tive in the struggle against the regime of Compaoré. They were organized mainly within 
two protest coalitions, Coalition contre la vie chère (Coalition against the high cost of 
living, CCVC) and Collectif des organisations démocratiques de masse et de partis poli-
tiques (Collective of the democratic mass organizations and political parties, CODMPP). 
The latter got established in 1998 as a result of opposition journalist Norbert Zongo’s 
assassination and the lack of prosecution of the assassins in the aftermath (Harsch 
2009). The CCVC in turn started their activities in 2008 as a reaction to rising food pric-
es (Engels 2015a). Balai Citoyen aimed at overcoming the routinization of protest 
events, the established opposition forces staged every year (Interview, media spokes-
person of Balai Citoyen, 10 March 2017, Ouagadougou). They took their inspiration for 
new protest tactics from the successful mobilizations of Y’en a marre, with whom they 
met during the annual film festival “Ciné Droit Libre” in 2013 (Interview movement 
leader, Balai Citoyen, 10 March 2017, Ouagadougou). Following their first press con-
ference on 18 July 2013, they launched their initial campaign one month later, calling 
the Burkinabe people to “unite in a civic action for democracy, freedom and good gov-
ernance” (Document, Balai Citoyen, Declaration, 12 August 2013). On 12 August 2013, 
party members were joined mainly by university students and journalist colleagues as 
well as other media representatives at Balai Citoyen’s first public reunion. Already at 
the outset, the media reported massively about the movement which was in as much 
due to the previous success of Y’en a marre as to their excellent media networks.   
The movement staged further protests in October and December 2013, on the an-
nual memorial days of former revolutionary president Thomas Sankara and the critical 
journalist Norbert Zongo. Along with other movements, they united activists on the 
central squares of the capital Ouagadougou to request justice for the assassinations of 




Sankara and Zongo for which they held Compaoré accountable (Frère and Englebart 
2015). Those mass events were followed by several smaller acts of protest that were 
partly organized by individual Cibals and Cibelles, abbreviation of “citoyens et 
citoyennes balayeurs” (civic brooms), the smallest unit of organization in the move-
ment (Document, Balai Citoyen, Statute 27 October 2016).  In the beginning of 2014, it 
became clear that Compaoré, despite his promises to hand over power, would try to 
amend Article 37 of the constitution, so that it would allow him to run for a third term 
in office. Article 37 limits the presidential mandate to two subsequent terms.  
To inform the public about Article 37 and the consequences of its amendment, Balai 
Citoyen held a public conference on 2 July 2014. But it became obvious that to fight the 
constitutional amendment was only the pretext to mobilize in order to overthrow the 
regime of Compaoré (Interview, movement leader Balai Citoyen, 10 March 2017, Oua-
gadougou). During the final days before the parliament was to vote on the amendment 
of Article 37, Balai Citoyen, the two major movement coalitions, and political parties 
called for resistance against the vote. Several trade unions went on strike. The mobili-
zations peaked just before the appointed vote of the national assembly on 31 October 
2014 (Chouli 2015). When several parliamentarians stated publicly to vote in favor of 
the amendment, hundreds of thousands took to the streets. By first blocking and then 
burning down the national assembly, they succeeded in hindering the parliamentary 
vote and Compaoré fled the country, seeking political asylum in Ivory Coast (Engels 
2015b).  
Similar to Y’en a marre, Balai Citoyen also brought together several issues under a 
‘citizenship frame’ in their mobilization against the retention of tenure limitations and 
the attempt to expand presidential power. In their diagnostic framing, they identified 
the suffering of the people, corrupt governance practices, and presidential accountabil-
ity as key problems for Burkina Faso. Balai Citoyen blamed the president and the ruling 
political elites for these deficiencies. On the one hand, the Burkinabe citizens have the 
right to economic development and a functioning judicial system; on the other hand, 
they also have the duty to control the politicians. Balai Citoyen attributes a watchdog 
function to the citizens, who have the duty to resist in the cases of violations of demo-
cratic rights, be that civic rights or constitutional rights.  
Corruption and bad governance were at the center of Balai Citoyen’s diagnostic 
framing. The presidential attempt to create a new senate in 2013 was framed as one of 
many examples where the ruling class used the state budget for their expensive pro-
jects while the majority of Burkinabe suffers to make a living (Interview, National coor-
dinator of Balai Citoyen, 16 March 2017, Ouagadougou). Using an ordinary tool that is 
easily accessible, the Burkinabe broom stands for the necessary cleaning of the corrupt 




system. Referring to the expensive buildings owned by state authorities, Balai Citoyen 
used them as further proof that those politicians rather lined their own pockets than 
those of the Burkinabe youth. Corruption was framed as an instrument of power of the 
current elite for their personal benefit. A reason why during those last insurrection 
days, their private houses and pricy cars were set on fire by protestors (Bonnecase 
2016).  
In their view, the private visible wealth of ministers in contrast to the national de-
velopment of Burkina Faso as one of the least developed countries highlighted the self-
ish rule of the president and hence his missing efforts to serve the nation as a demo-
cratically elected president (Protestsong, “Ce président là”, Sams’K Le Jah). As a result, 
this president had forfeited the right to rerun for the upcoming elections. Because in 
their vision of democratic presidents, the main duty is to develop the country’s pros-
perity and secondly to install justice by applying laws to civil servants and politicians, 
should be treated as every citizen. Compaoré and his clan were portrayed as the main 
profiteers of this patronage system that hindered any justice to be reached, neither in 
socioeconomic nor in juridical terms.  
Balai Citoyen thus understands citizens’ rights as socio-economic rights. Their diag-
nostic frame is based on the ideal that economic development goes hand in hand with 
a democratic one. Within their economic demands, Balai Citoyen took up the frame of 
the high costs of living, revitalized by the CCVC in 2008. However, while the CCVC 
stressed the neoliberal agenda of governmental decisions that served international in-
terests better than local ones, Balai Citoyen strategically transformed this frame by 
blaming corruption and not neoliberalism as the cause for uneven development. The 
people have the obligation to stand up for their collective rights and to fight for re-
sponsive governance in economic and democratic terms.  
However, Balai Citoyen also diagnoses the malfunctioning of the juridical institu-
tions, the violation of the rule of law and of citizens’ rights through state authorities, as 
a central problem. Justice, is not just economic justice, but also refers to the juridical 
clarification of Norbert Zongo’s and former socialist president Thomas Sankara’s closed 
files concerning their assassinations. Balai Citoyen holds Compaoré personally ac-
countable for this impunity that had characterized his regime since the beginning when 
he came to power by violently overthrowing his predecessor Thomas Sankara (Zeilig 
2016).  
In their prognostic framing they demand a president who develops Burkina Faso for 
the benefit of all and in line with Sankara’s thoughts. They claim that political change is 
only feasible if the Burkinabe people chase Compaoré out of office (Document, Balai 
Citoyen, Declaration, 12 August 2013; Interview Smockey, 14.03.2017, Ouagadougou). 




They frame this as the only way to reopen the closed juridical files and to hold corrupt 
elites responsible for their insincere behavior. As a solution to the problems identified 
by the movement, they present the compliance to the rule of law, highlighting the sep-
aration of powers and the civic exercise to monitor this relation. This would guarantee 
good governance from their point of view (Interview Smockey, 17 November 2016, 
Berlin). They envisioned a three-part victory of “justice over injustice, the people 
against the rulers, and democrats against autocrats” (Document, Balai Citoyen, Decla-
ration, 12 August 2013). The movement leaders clearly prefer alternation, not revolu-
tion as a first step towards an alternative regime. This sets them apart from protest 
leaders of Marxist trade unions or student associations who represent the former anti-
Compaoré-coalition (Wienkoop 2017). However, beyond a change in presidency Balai 
Citoyen does not have a clear vision of how to solve the grievances in specific policy 
recommendations.  
Regarding their motivational framing, the leaders underline the urgency of the upris-
ing due to an optional change of the constitution that would practically allow Com-
paoré to run anew. After 27 years in office, Balai Citoyen portrays the constitutional 
amendment plan of Compaoré as the last opportunity to get rid of an autocratic ruling 
president. In particular and similar to Y’en a marre, they highlight the youth as the 
most powerful opponent.  
 
 
6. Comparing Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen – The devil lies in the civic (pro-
test) culture 
   
The frame analysis of Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen has shown that corruption has 
been a key issue for both movements within their fight against constitutional amend-
ments. Even though they mobilized primarily against unwanted presidents, they suc-
cessfully linked the issue of corruption to their fight against term amendment bids. 
They succeeded in doing so through a citizenship’ frame. Citizenship in its three dimen-
sions of rights, duties, and empowerment has proved to be a persuasive concept that 
allowed them to bond issues of corruption, the rule of law, and socio-economic griev-
ances with their struggles against another presidential term. In their citizenship frame 
both movements take up socio-economic grievances of the majority of the population 
and frame them as a violation of citizens’ rights, for which they blame bad governance 
practices, including corruption, of the political elites. They contrast the personal wealth 
of state representatives with the poverty of the majority. Both movements argue that 
the elected presidents have to understand themselves as servants of the nation, in-




stead of pursuing their own individual or international interests. Thereby, the spokes-
persons bridge corruption to democracy in referring on the one hand to the presiden-
tial duty to economically develop the country that in turn would lead to better living 
conditions, and on the other to the citizens’ rights to housing, education, healthcare 
and so on. The latter also points to the duty of political representatives in democracies 
as respondents to the population’s interests. However, both movements do not ques-
tion the neoliberal ideal of parallel democratic and economic development that has 
been originally promoted by international development institutions as part of structur-
al adjustment programs in the 1990s. Accordingly, national economic development 
constitutes for the movement leaders also an indicator of good democratic govern-
ance. 
Both movements chose frames conceiving of citizens as empowered citizens who 
have the duty to play a watchdog role both to democratic ruling and corruption. Both 
stress the importance of compliance to the rule of law to fight corruption and establish 
responsive institutions. The political elites and the presidents are framed as part of the 
people who have to comply with binding laws.  
This similar strategy used by Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen to link corruption to ex-
tended term ambitions in a citizenship frame can be explained by the similarities of 
both movements but also the colonial imprint of the French republican model in both 
countries. Following this concept of democracy, Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen high-
light the positivist conception of citizens’ rights, underlining the possibilities for partici-
pation. In a republican model, the highest aim is a political sphere based on solidarity 
and moral life and not on conflicting interests. Consequently, the national unity of the 
people is ranked higher than mechanisms to revitalize debates as in deliberative demo-
cratic ideals. Moreover, similarities in their framing are also due to the role model func-
tion Y’en marre’s success had for the Burkinabe uprising. Seeing that the leaders of 
Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen met on several occasions, some of the similarities are 
also due to Balai Citoyen modeling their protests in part on Y’en a marre’s successful 
framing strategies. Frame diffusion thus provides a crucial factor explaining the similar-
ities in the movements’ choices of frames.     
Yet, we also observe major differences in the way their citizenship frames were or-
ganized. In their construction of an empowered citizen, Y’en a marre emphasizes that 
the Senegalese citizens have to liberate themselves from their resignation to become 
politically active. Their strategy to fight corruption is to change learned or accepted so-
cializations of corrupt practices within the political system and Senegalese society. Y’en 
a marre thus puts forward the idea of a Nouveau Type de Sénégalais, a new type of en-
gaged Senegalese citizen. This resonates well with their movements’ identity. Y’en a 




marre leaders and activists portray themselves frequently as honest, upright and en-
gaged citizens (Interviews, activists Y’en a marre, Dakar; 09.02.2012; 16.02.2012). Dur-
ing their protest events they communicate this not only through words but also in col-
lecting the rubbish after every gathering, during confrontations with security forces 
they cross their arms above their head to indicate, they are peaceful (non-participating 
observations of protests by Louisa Prause, 23 June 2011; 22 January 2012; 27 January 
2012; 12 February 2012; Dakar).     
Balai Citoyen on the other hand refers to their Burkinabe constituency as already 
empowered citizens due to previous struggles. Under their main slogan “Notre nombre 
est notre force” (Our number is our strength), they evoke the contentious history of the 
Burkinabe people. The Burkinabe identity as remarkable contentious is a strong image 
in the wider cultural discourse on national identity in Burkina Faso. Balai Citoyen thus 
frequently evoked their struggles in the tradition of the former socialist president 
Thomas Sankara who is especially popular among the younger generation (Zeilig 2016). 
During their sit-ins, they motivated their followers to sing the national anthem and to 
shout “la patrie ou la mort” (Homeland or death) in reference to him. However, they 
extended a frame based purely on Sankara’s ideology to include the values of a consti-
tutional democracy by referring to Burkinabe citizens as “democratic defenders” (Doc-
ument, Balai Citoyen, Declaration, 12 August 2013; Statue, Balai Citoyen, 27 October 
2016). This stands in sharp contrast to the military regime of Sankara and his Marxist 
and Pan-African visions.  
They present a Burkinabe citizen as someone who feels a belonging to and responsi-
bility for the nation and who follows his or her citizen’s duty to resist in case of misuse 
of power. In reference to the meaning of their country’s name, Burkina Faso signifies 
“country of the sincere people”, they conceptualize the Burkinabe people as sincere 
and upright citizens. They contrast this image with the corrupt political elites. When 
Y’en a marre refers to the citizens’ duty to defend republican and democratic values, 
Balai Citoyen refers to the duty of defending the heritage of Thomas Sankara. Thus, 
while Y’en a marre puts forward the establishment of a new citizenship consciousness 
in Senegal as the solution to the problems, Balai Citoyen anticipates the solution in a 
revitalization of Burkinabe identity that they glorify in a rather backwards turned patri-
otism. As such they relate their different conceptualizations of citizenship to their re-
spective movement identities, which they based on broader notions of collective iden-
tities in both countries.  
Differences in their construction of a citizenship frame can furthermore be explained 
by the dissimilar historical experiences of struggles in both countries. Burkina Faso has, 
different from Senegal, a strong history of revolutionary fights. This includes the regime 




of former president Thomas Sankara ruling from 1983 till 1987, the protests against 
impunity in the 1990s and the recent protests against the high costs of living in the 
mid-2000s. Senegal has a very different protest tradition. Key reference point of the 
Y’en a marre movement was the peaceful change of power in 2000, which was preced-
ed by protests for democracy mainly by the Senegalese youth. To amplify their frames, 
they therefore evoked democratic values more than revolutionary ones and build on 
the idea of an emancipated citizen that has already been put forward by the earlier 
youth movement Boule Fale (Prause 2013).  
Furthermore, since it was the youth who voted Wade to power in 2000, Y’en a marre 
considers the youth as responsible for the control of their elected representatives in 
order to end corrupt practices. The experience of the youth in Burkina Faso in turn was 
marked by Compaoré as an autocratic long-term ruler who they experienced as their 
only ruler. Balai Citoyen thus attributed the responsibility for corruption solely to the 
political elites.   
While both movements closely linked the fight against corruption and for consoli-
dated democratic institutions to the rule of law in general, Balai Citoyen relates this ar-
gument to particular historic cases of non-reached justice. They hold Compaoré and his 
ministers responsible for the persisting impunity that past political assassinations have 
not been investigated under his rule. Y’en a marre, in reverse, envisions an educated 
public that is aware of their rights as a first step to strengthen the rule of law and 
hence to fight corruption. They point out that corruption is reproduced both through 
the behavior of political elites and ordinary citizens. Balai Citoyen, by contrast, attrib-
utes corruption to a small circle of elites surrounding the former president.    
Thus, while a ‘citizenship frame’ has proved essential in both cases to bridge corrup-
tion to struggles against presidential term amendments, the way the movements orga-
nized their framing is highly dependent on the countries’ histories, existing collective 
identities and the protest experiences of their constituency.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This article addressed the question of how the movements Y’en a marre and Balai 
Citoyen in Senegal and Burkina Faso succeeded in linking the fight against corruption 
with their struggle against third term amendments. We used the framing approach to 
analyze how Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen convincingly integrated the fight against 
corruption with their struggle against third term bids. Our analysis has shown that both 
movements succeeded in linking these different issues through a ‘citizenship frame’ 
that has proven to be a frame wide enough to integrate several previously unconnect-




ed issues. Both movements succeeded to link socio-economic everyday grievances to 
political grievances such as the violation of the rule of law, corruption scandals among 
elites, and power-hungry presidents that try to revise constitutional democracy 
through the backdoor. The similarities in the frames put forward by both movements 
can partly be explained through diffusion processes. Balai Citoyen modeled their 
frames in parts on Y’en a marre. Furthermore, both countries share similar colonial ex-
periences and as such a French republican understanding of citizenship. Nevertheless, 
the frame analysis of both movements allows us to hypothesis that the concept of citi-
zenship might provide a key discursive figure that allows movements to integrate cor-
ruption within struggles against third term amendments. However, this proclaimed role 
of ‘citizenship’ needs to be tested by further research along other case studies. For fu-
ture research, it would be especially interesting to look at examples in countries that 
are more and less democratic as it might be that those institutional conditions affect 
the way citizens are addressed and citizenship is framed by social movements.   
Two key features explain why Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen differ in many aspects 
in the way they constructed their citizenship frame: i) varying histories of democratiza-
tion and protests; ii) different collective identities.  
Y’en a marre stresses past democratic experiences, such as the peaceful change of 
power from former socialist president Abou Diouf to liberal president Abdoulaye Wade 
in 2000. Balai Citoyen on the other hand refers to past revolutionary struggles and 
icons in Burkina Faso, such as the socialist president Thomas Sankara. Thus, the differ-
ent cultural contexts and political experiences provided different incentives for frame 
amplification. The distinctions of both struggles illustrate the essential role of the re-
spective political culture and shared values in a society. Y’en a marre builds upon a col-
lective identity that portrays themselves as engaged and upright citizens who respect 
the laws. Balai Citoyen on the other hand plays upon a collective identity that stresses 
the contentiousness and the refusal to accept authority blindly. According to these dif-
ferent collective identities, they also put forward different perspectives to fight corrup-
tion: Whereas Balai Citoyen calls for the political elite to stop corruption and hence 
tend to change corruption from above, Y’en a marre aims at changing the civic culture 
to more collective responsibility and thus believes to change corruption from below. 
Differences in the way the citizenship frame is organized and constructed in detail can 
thus be explained by differences in the specific cultural background and identities. This 
results in a diverting perception of a solution to fight corruption.  
The framing approach has proven to be an important theoretical tool (i) to analyze 
how movements succeed in linking the fight against corruption to term amendment 
struggles and (ii) to work out distinct details that differentiate the framing of corrup-




tion in movements that seem very similar at first sight. However, our analysis has also 
shown that the framing approach on its own is limited in explaining why social move-
ment leaders chose certain frames; and thus why corruption is framed differently. To 
identify the factors that impact framing choices it is essential to combine the concept 
of framing with other concepts derived from social movement research. In our analysis 
the varying political culture, former protest experiences and collective identities have 
proven to be essential elements to explain differences in the movement frames. For 
further investigation, it would be interesting to combine our insights with those of a 
more interactive perspective such as multi-organizational fields in order to account for 
the influences of allies, opponents, and institutions with whom both movements con-
stantly engaged.  
The importance of the cultural context for the framing of corruption confirms the 
significance of a political cultural perspective within corruption research that highlights 
the role of emancipative values and norms to hold governments responsible for cor-
ruption by mass mobilization. It extends their findings in the way that our qualitative 
approach shows how broader cultural values and mobilization are connected.  
Our analysis has further shown that anti-corruption struggles are not just a phenom-
enon for movements in the Global North. Despite a highly corrupt and semi-democratic 
setting, both movements mobilized eventful protests against corruption. This questions 
the assumption that such collective mobilizations can only be expected to be successful 
in consolidated democracies (see among others Welzel 2013). African social move-
ments increasingly address this issue, albeit rarely in itself and rather as part of larger 
struggles for democracy. Hereby they use innovative ways to tackle corruption: they do 
not just blame political elites but frame the fight against corruption as a citizen’s fight.  
However, many claims concerning democratic values that stand in direct relation to 
corruption such as transparency and participation do not apply to Y’en a marre and 
Balai Citoyen themselves. Both movements are hierarchically structured. A core team 
of well-known rap artists and journalists directs both movements. Furthermore, it also 
is unclear from which sources both movements receive their financial means and how 
much money the movement leaders actually earn through talks and speeches. So far, 
this has not blemished the reputation of Y’en a marre. Here, the movement leaders are 
still well respected, at least by their primary addressees, in contrast to Burkina Faso 
where critical voices grow questioning the representativeness and accountability of 
Balai Citoyen.  
The current reading of Y’en a marre and Balai Citoyen, as well as similar movements 
in other countries such as Filimbi in the Democratic Republic in Congo, views them 
mainly as mobilizations against democratic backslidings. However, a closer look at their 




framings has revealed that the struggle for democracy is only one issue among many. 
These two West African movements are good examples of successfully linking concerns 
about corrupt elites to governmental legitimacy and bridging claims on democratic and 
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